Why Ukraine Still Matters with Marie Yovanovitch

TOPICS DISCUSSED

  • Ukraine’s Post-Soviet Development and Challenges

  • Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

  • Lessons from the Edge by Marie Yovanovitch

  • Outside of Politics: Seeing Ukraine as More than its Conflict

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EPISODE RESOURCES

UKRAINE

TRANSCRIPT

Sarah [00:00:07] This is Sarah Stewart Holland.  

Beth [00:00:08] And this is Beth Silvers. 

Sarah [00:00:10] Thank you for joining us for Pantsuit Politics.  

Beth [00:00:25] Hello and thank you for joining us for a very special episode of Pantsuit Politics. Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago, and as Sarah and I considered how to mark that time and reflect on all that transpired before the invasion and what has transpired since, we knew we wanted to talk with someone with real meaningful expertise in Ukraine and someone who has been in relationship with Ukraine. And we could think of no better person than former Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch. Ambassador Yovanovitch served as the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2016 to 2019. And that is just one piece of a long, dedicated career in public service that she's documented in her book, Lessons From the Edge. We were so honored to spend an hour with Ambassador Yovanovitch and so enriched by the conversation. And so, without further ado, I just want to get right into sharing that discussion with all of you. Ambassador Yovanovitch, we are so thrilled and honored to have you here today. I wonder if we could go back in time a little bit. And I know that to fully understand the war right now, you have to go way back in time. But could you take us to the Orange Revolution and just tell us a little bit about Ukraine as a developing country and the relationship with Russia?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:01:43] I will try to keep this brief because, as you noted, it's super complicated and there's so many different elements extending over the centuries. But in 1991, the Soviet Union, as we all recall, dissolved; and it left 15 new countries, including Russia and Ukraine, in its wake. And all of these countries had to figure out where they were going. And most of them said we want to be a democracy; we want to be a market economy. But the leadership pretty much, I think without exception, was the same as it had been the day before the Soviet Union for each of these new countries. They all had been in the Politburo-- the first secretaries of their respective republics. These were pretty much, again, without exception, old men who had no idea what it meant to create a democracy or a market economy. They didn't really understand the concepts and they didn't know what to do. And so, many of these countries, including Russia and Ukraine, of their own volition, started that journey. They asked the foreign communities, including the US-- but not only the US, France, Germany, the UK, the EU, international financial institutions-- to help. But as we all know, reform is very, very difficult. And who pays the price? It's always the poorest people. It was just a very, very difficult-- I don't even want to say transition because Russia never fully made it, and sadly, as we know-- but journey, shall we say. And for Ukraine, which was more successful, it was slow and painful in the 1990s. But by the end of the 1990s, they were starting to have the beginnings of civil society. And what is civil society? That's like you and me going out and joining the PTA or joining the beautification society for your city or calling up your mayor and saying, hey, there's a really dangerous crossroads here and you need to put a stop sign here because there have been too many accidents and getting your neighbors to sign a petition. Its citizens being active, involved, engaged, educated and holding leadership accountable. That is, obviously, the backbone of democracy is free and fair elections, but civil society is the backbone of that.  

[00:04:05] So that was starting to develop in Ukraine in the late 1990s. You had investigative journalists. You had people creating their own little organizations of whatever mattered to them, not necessarily in politics, big politics, but whatever mattered to them. Again, just another trip down back in time, why wasn't civil society active before in places like Ukraine and Russia? Because of the Communist Party. The Communist Party wanted to control everything. They stamped out any kind of initiative, even if it was the chess club. Because if you had groups of people meeting together, they could start talking about stuff, they could start criticizing, and that would be bad. So, everything had to have the imprimatur of the Communist Party. And so, people in 1991 didn't have the skills and the mindset to sort of take matters into their own hands. And when I say matters, I don't mean, again, big politics. I mean the day to day stuff that all of us do every day to make sure our lives are better and our communities are better. Fast forward to the 2000/2004 for the Orange Revolution, which I think is where you started the question, there were presidential elections and there was a clear favorite in the country, a guy named Yushchenko, who was actually poisoned during the campaign, if you can believe it. He lost in the second round. And people took to the streets in the fall of 2004. And Ukraine in the fall is cold. People just stuck it out. And President Kuchma, who in many ways I am very critical of, but he did the most important thing for the democracy of Ukraine. He allowed the people to demonstrate. He did not use force against them, and he allowed the court process of whether or not there should be a rerun of the elections to go forward without intervention. That was unusual in those times and actually still to a certain extent today. And the court ruled that the elections had been fiddled and they were run again. And Yushchenko, the favorite, did win.  

[00:06:09] So the people, though, they were like, yay, we won and we're going to leave the governing of the country to the politicians because we did our thing. We're going to go back to our regular lives. And, unfortunately, Yushchenko was a real disappointment as president, he was not the reformer that people thought. Well, he had been a reformer. He did not continue in that vein effectively as president. Because of his incompetence and because of the infighting with his prime minister, the next elections Yanukovych won in 2009. And he started off kind of okay, but pretty quickly he took corruption and Ukraine to an entirely new level. As a result, he was not very popular and there was even a lot of opposition among the elites because he was taking their fair share of the cut too. And so, that engendered a lot of resentment. In 2013, Ukraine was supposed to sign an agreement in November with the EU about becoming closer to the EU. Ukrainian people really wanted that, not for political reasons, for economic reasons, because it would have made trading and doing business with the EU easier. It also would have opened up some the possibility for educational exchanges for easier travel to Europe. A lot of young people wanted that. They wanted even to be able to go to Paris. He doesn't want to do that. But they also wanted to go to get an education, whether it's as an exchange student or a four year college, whatever it might be. And Putin kind of inserted himself and offered Ukraine a $15 billion loan with $3 billion payable immediately. And Yanukovych decided that that was the better course. So, completely unexpectedly-- I mean, nobody was prepared for this, including his closest staff-- he actually went to the meeting but refused to sign, which is very unusual. I mean, usually these things are scripted to the max.  

[00:08:19] And when he came back and it was declared to the Ukrainian people what had happened, a bunch of college students went to the square, to the Maidan, as it's called, and protested. And it was a small, peaceful protest. But as often happens with authoritarian leaders, he overplayed his hand and he sent down the police. And an investigative journalist named Mustafa Nayyem, he Facebooked and he said, "What's going on? Are we going to support our students?" And people went to the square and every day more people went to the square and there were ups and downs and everything else. But it went on through February of 2014. And, ironically, there was actually a deal that was cut with the EU and the leaders of the people on the square, as well as Yanukovych, to allow him to stay in power, move elections forward to December 28, 2014. But the ink wasn't even dry on that and he fled the country to Russia. And so, that was the revolution of dignity, the second big revolution in Ukraine. And what that revolution meant was we want to live in dignity. We want to live according to the rule of law, which means that the same law applies to you as applies to me no matter how powerful you are. And if you are stealing, as Yanukovych was-- and that $3 billion down payment from Putin that went right into his pocket and right back to Russia-- that you will be held accountable. We want to live according to Western values. We want to be able to send our kids for an education in the EU. We want to be able to do business with the EU. It's not that we want to live in the EU, but we want the same kinds of freedoms that they have there and the same kinds of accountability that they have there. So, that was in February of 2014. Several months later, they were elections when President Poroshenko came to power. So, I'll start there. I think you said you wanted a short answer and...  

Beth [00:10:18] No, I know it's not really available-- short answer.  

Sarah [00:10:21] Before we keep moving forward, in your book, Lessons From the Edge-- which I highly recommend to everybody, it's incredible-- you highlight something that I think helps me so much put pieces together in both Russia and Ukraine, because we talk about corruption and it almost starts to feel like a character flaw of the people as opposed to, like, how did we get here? Why are there these oligarchs? And when you talk about, okay, well, the USSR dissolved and this is what they did with the state property, can you explain that? Because this is how we got to this place with oligarchs and corruption both in Ukraine and in Russia. And I thought that was so helpful. Can you explain that?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:11:03] Yeah. And one thing I just want to say about the Revolution of Dignity, we when we think about Ukraine, now we think about how brave and resolute the people are in the war. But before this next word was always corruption. The reason was because the Ukrainian people stood up and said, "We have corrupt leaders and we want to hold them accountable and we want to do something about this." And we all know that making those kinds of changes systemically is very, very hard. But they got a start on it in 2014. I mean, before 2014, we in the U.S. government were not talking about corruption in Ukraine. It was the Ukrainian people that put that into the conversation. And because there's often this view that somehow the U.S. imposes assistance on countries and they're forced to do things they don't want to do-- I'm not saying that there are some tough negotiations where countries do things that are very difficult because they want our assistance. They don't need to take our assistance, but we have conditionality that if you're going to throw good money after bad, we're not going to be supporting that. You're going to be diverting the funds to special people. We're not going to be supporting that. We didn't really talk about corruption before because it wasn't supported within the government. I mean, I was there in from 2001 to 2004 as the number two. And if we had talked about corruption in Ukraine, the president would have escorted us out of his office. Contrast that to my arrival in Ukraine in 2016, where when I had my first meeting with President Poroshenko, where I presented my credentials from our president, he raised corruption and talked about what they are doing and how they are partnering with us on this. The Ukrainian people understand that they have a challenge. It is most challenging to them, and they're the ones who raised it and they're the ones who are most intent on this. And so, I think that's very important to understand. So, going back in history, the Communist Party itself was a very corrupt institution. And so, some were more equal than others, so they got special apartments. They were the ones who got the good university slots for their kids. It was a whole tiered system of who got what special privileges and extra money on the side.  

[00:13:32] And just because the Soviet Union fell apart, it doesn't mean that system went away. It was all the same people and the same jobs. And so, they kind of inherited that. And that was fine with them because they were benefiting. But then as society became more active and involved and educated, they were like, whoa, wait a minute; this isn't right. And that was the very, very slow revolution in the 1990s and the aughts that I was describing before. But in parallel with that, when the Ukrainian and the Russian people and governments and others came to the international community and said how do we change from a command economy where somebody in Moscow decides every economic decision. How many boots are going to be made in a particular factory in Kharkiv? And what style the boots are going to be and everything else. And then 5000 boots of exactly the same kind are put out all over the Soviet Union. And if you want boots that year, that's what you're going to buy. There's not going to be a choice. The market does not decide in a command economy. So, how do you go from that kind of a command economy to a market economy where there is so much flexibility, so much flux? And the leadership in a country-- not just the top dogs, but all the way down, they weren't brought up on what a market economy is. I barely understand it [Inaudible]. But I kind of understand about supply and demand and some of the other basic principles. So, this was very hard. And, of course, they state owned all property-- even your apartment. They state owned your apartment, your apartment buildings. But they also owned the big mega, mega, mega corporations. And so, it was decided that in order to divest the state of all of this, there would be privatization and they would print out vouchers for a share in the factories and the property. And there were stages of privatization. At this time there was a lot of chaos because the old social contract of the party is going to take care of you and make every decision for you, that went away. There was nothing really to replace it yet.  

[00:15:53] The ruble just tanked, as did the hryvnia of the Ukrainian currency. And so, people's life savings, such as it was, went away. It was a very difficult time for many Russians, many Ukrainians, many others. And so, as this privatization process started, people were given vouchers.  And this is to people who have no concept of what a market economy is. And they're told now you have a share in this factory. Very theoretical when you're wondering how am I going to put food on the table for my children tonight. And so, of course, there were some people who understood. The powerful, the ruthless, the criminal. And the criminal and the security services really made out very well in this deal. They would go around and they would buy up your vouchers for nothing because people were grateful to get money for dinner that night when, of course, what they were giving away was a share in a factory or whatever it might be. They accumulated all of this money and property and influence. And over time, they became known as the oligarchs. This left a very sour taste in the mouths of many Russians. By the time I got there in 1993, they were like, if this is what capitalism is, if this is what democracy is, you can keep it because we like [inaudible]. So, it was a really rough time for many ordinary Russians. And so, the ones who were making out literally like bandits, they really prospered. And it was truly the wild, wild West when I was there in Moscow with shootouts in broad daylight between warring clans and so forth. But some of the things that these people were doing other than killing each other were actually not illegal because the system of regulations and laws that have developed over the centuries in the West was not in place in Russia in order to protect against abuses such as I have described. So, it was a very, very difficult time.  

Sarah [00:18:08] Well, and I just have to imagine. I like how you talk about your family, like when you're trying to build civil society and they're, like, for what? To what purpose? Like you said, they have no parameter, no framework for, like, what would I be gathering in a group to build? This is how the system works, whether you call it capitalism or communism, we're still at the bottom. And it's just so discouraging. And I just think it's helpful, like right now, if we go all the way back up today when we're watching Russian society and we're watching protest, but then we're seeing big parades for Putin and we're so confused and we're like, how could you? I think that just adds a lot of really important context. If you don't have any concept of what civil society or rule of law or a functioning capitalistic system looks like, when somebody tells you, "Well, you're getting screwed," you're like, "What's the difference?" 

Marie Yovanovitch [00:19:01] Yeah.  

Beth [00:19:03] I think this march through that hope and disappointment for both the Russian people and the Ukrainian people is really helpful. So, can we pick up with President Poroshenko because he feels like a continuation of that in some respects to me. And I wonder if that's what you saw while you were there.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:19:21] Yeah. Of the good and the bad. So, there are six major oligarchs in Ukraine, and Poroshenko was one of them. He had been in every government since about the year 2000. And he had come to power on a very overwhelming mandate for reform in Ukrainian politics. Which is often the case in Europe, there are two rounds of presidential elections. So, in the first round, there could be like 40 candidates and then the top two get winnowed out into the second round. And in all previous presidential elections, there had been two rounds. In this presidential election when Poroshenko won, he was the first and only president to win in the first round. So, he had a strong mandate and he had a strong mandate for reform and anti-corruption, and he understood that. Moreover, the other oligarchs also understood that. And so, reform is often very difficult because you're breaking somebody's [inaudible]. If funds are going to go one way or funds are not going to be diverted into somebody's pocket, somebody loses. They should lose. But they don't feel that way, so they're going to fight back. But there was a moment in 2014, which is before I arrived, where reforms were difficult, but still very possible. And they pushed through a number of anti-corruption reforms as well as other reforms. He had a great prime minister who was very, very courageous. But as in our country, there's only a moment for reforms. That window does not last forever. And so, very hard to do everything all at once despite the movie. So, some of the people who had stolen from the state before were not held to account. They started feeling, well, I didn't go to jail, I wasn't punished, I was held accountable, maybe I can start pushing back on some of this. So over time, they started pushing back and became harder and harder. By 2016, August 2016, when I arrived, it was a more difficult environment. Reforms were still moving forward, but it was much, much harder.  

Beth [00:21:29] Take us to the pre-invasion period and how you think about what happened with Crimea before this invasion and why we kind of settled in the world on calling that an annexation. And just what is different about this invasion than what happened in Crimea? That's a big question, I know, but we'd love to hear your thoughts.  

Sarah [00:21:48] You're used to big questions. We know.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:21:53] The Russians are sort of cherry picking in history. And so, they're saying, "Well, Khrushchev back in the 1950s, he gave it that territory as a gift to Ukraine when it was never envisioned that the Soviet Union would break apart, and Crimea is historically Russian. And so, we should have it back." And many Russians believe that, and they've been very active in putting that out there just informing the world and a lot of people accept that, including, frankly, former President Trump. But the reality is that history doesn't start when the Russians want it to start. Before the Russians had Crimea as part of their empire, it was first held by the Crimean Tatars, hence the name Crimea, and was part of that Khanate, their own empire, and then it was part of the Ottoman Empire and then it became part of the Russian Empire. Then when it became the Soviet Union, it was part of the Soviet Union. First as part of Russia, then as part of Ukraine when Poroshenko gave that part of it to Ukraine, because it's geographically close to Ukraine. When independence came in 1991, there were referendums. There was a referendum in Ukraine. And every oblast, which is like a state, and territory like Crimea, voted on whether to become independent or not and be a part of the new Ukrainian state. And they all voted for that, including Crimea. So, that was 1991. Moving forward, public opinion polling showed that through the next 20 years, there was no desire for Crimea to become independent or to become part of Russia. They considered themselves to be part of Ukraine. But Putin had other ideas. I think Putin sees himself-- he's quite open about this-- as being the spiritual heir of Peter the Great, one of the Tsars who gathered in the Russian lands and made the Russian empire grow bigger and greater. And he wanted that land back for Russia for reasons of his own in terms of how he stands in history, but also as part of extending the Russian empire. And also, strategically because the Russians have long desired to have a warm water port in the Black Sea. These are international waters of the Black Sea, and it's huge. But they want to make it a Russian lake. They want to control the whole thing. And that is not acceptable to most countries in the world who want to use those commercial shipping lanes, among other things. And, of course, there are a number of NATO countries that are also on the periphery of the Black Sea.  

[00:24:39] So, during the chaos of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Putin put his longstanding, (it should be noted) plans in motion to annex, to take over Crimea. And he did that quite successfully using something that the Russians call a maskirovka, masking what their intentions were. So, they sent in armed people, they were in uniform, but they had no insignia and they would not say who they were with. Obviously, government intelligence knew who they were with. The Putin was saying, "No, it's not us. It's not us." It took him a year to admit that, in fact, it was Russia. And it was hard, I think, for Western nations to figure out what to do. And, frankly, they never did actually figure out what to do. And within a week, Crimea was under Russian control. We call the men in the green uniforms the little green men. So, it was under Russian control. And then within a month, there was a vote that was taken in Crimea that was not recognized by any foreign powers. It was completely illegal. It was done at the barrel of a gun. And the Crimean people voted to become a part of Russia. And that was the only choice. There wasn't another choice of what they could vote for. And since then, Russia has, as we say, annexed Crimea and has made it into basically a garrison state to the south of Ukraine, threatening Ukraine and controlling the people and abusing the Crimean Tatars that have remained. I mean, these are a people that have really suffered so much over history because one of the things that Russia and those who support Russia say is, but the population is majority Russian in Crimea, which is true. And why is that true? It's true because Stalin deported the Crimean Tatars during and after World War Two and replaced them with Russians. So, if you're deporting the people who live there and replacing them with Russians, yeah, I guess it is majority Russian, but you have to really look at how that happens. So, in 1991, when Ukraine became independent, many of the Crimean Tatars or their descendants came back very difficult because, of course, Russians were living in their homes, etc., etc.. But many of them tried to make new lives for themselves in their historic homeland. And now they've been forced to flee again or live under an occupation. It is absolutely tragic. And so, you asked about the word annexation, Beth. So, the U.S. government-- actually when I worked for the U.S. government, I had to say -- purported annexation, which means that the Russians are saying they took it over. But we do not accept that internationally and legally. Now that I no longer in the U.S. government, I just say annexation. It seems simpler. It is a statement of fact, if not legality.  

Sarah [00:27:49] So, what do you think Putin learned during the purported annexation that got us to the invasion of Ukraine? Or was that a part of the plan all the time? I mean, there's a small window for reform and there's a small window for that kind of stuff, and he seems to realize that as well.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:28:04] After Crimea, forces under Russian control invaded the east of Ukraine, commonly known as the Donetsk area. And there's fighting there, again, as you know. And that war never stopped. I mean, there were two agreements in 2014, 2015 for a cease fire, all sorts of things that the Russians needed to do, the Ukrainians needed to do. The Ukrainians did some of those things. The Russians did nothing. They didn't even cease fire. So, while this was not big news in the United States, I mean, three or four people a week died-- soldiers, but also civilians on the front line-- because people still lived there. This was a low level war in the heart of Europe. And when I was there as ambassador, I thought that that was enough for Putin. That destabilization that any war brings to a country, the outflow of resources was enough because it was really screwing up Ukraine's plans to look West to eventually EU membership, maybe even NATO membership, etc. And it was just destabilizing in the country because Russia used other methods as well, assassinations right in the heart of Kiev, things like that, disinformation, cyber-attacks. I thought that was enough, but I was wrong. It turns out that what Putin had been saying about Empire and writing about Empire, most famously in his essay of the summer of '21, about how the Ukrainians are not a real people. They don't have a real culture. Ukraine doesn't exist without being a part of Russia. But that was all true. He wanted to annex the entire country and control the entire country. I think as you said, Sarah, I think he saw a window. He saw a window where he thought that the West was weak. This was, as so you recall, shortly after our withdrawal from Afghanistan, which I think he probably viewed as a disaster and not well-handled by the US. I think he looked at the Biden administration and did not think that the Biden administration would be able to bring a group of allies and partners together to support Ukraine. He looked at Ukraine, and because he has this weird obsession and belief that the Ukrainians are not a real people, he completely did not understand that they actually are and that they are going to fight back, which they did. And then, of course, there was the obvious incompetence, not to say criminal incompetence of the Russian military. And it goes to show you there are many things that obviously went wrong with the Russian invasion and continue to go wrong with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Part of the reason is corruption. Where they had huge military budgets, but it wasn't going to purpose. It was going into the pockets of the generals, pockets probably of Putin and others. And they discovered that the hard way, that they didn't have a military, or equipment, or trained soldiers that could actually do the job.  

Beth [00:31:23] What was your assessment of President Zelensky pre-invasion, and what is standing out to you as you have watched him respond?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:31:31] I knew him as a comedian and as a candidate. I met him probably five or six times. The first time I met him, he made a point of saying that he was a businessman, that he had created this entertainment conglomerate through his hard work and through his creativity, through his team. He was very intent that I not think of him as an entertainer, although he was an entertainer as well. He was clear to say. And he was very funny, of course, but he saw himself or wanted to present himself as a business person. And he deserves those kudos. So, I actually left Ukraine for the last time as ambassador on May 20th, 2019, which was the day of his inauguration. So, I never actually worked with him as president. But I would just know that he struggled as president in those first few years. He went from winning the elections by 73%. I mean, that's a huge margin. And he was down in the twenties in terms of popularity ratings on February 23rd, 2022. It's tough to be president under any circumstances in any country. And I think he found that out. And so, he was struggling and very focused. I was in Ukraine right before the war started, and he was very focused on the internal political situation and his position and upcoming elections in 2024 and trying to position himself in the right way. The big question before the war and in many circles in the United States and elsewhere, including Ukraine, was could this comedian, businessman, now president, be the wartime leader to lead a country against Russia? And I wasn't sure, but very, very quickly Zelensky established himself as-- and this is a cliche, but it's apt-- as the Churchill of our times. I mean, I just recalled for you the Russians were obviously throwing everything at Ukraine militarily, but also disinformation-wise and putting out that pathetic Zelensky had fled the country, he was a coward, Ukraine capital was about to fall, and all these things. And if you're sitting in some village in rural Ukraine, you don't know any different. Zelensky went out think I did two or three with his team in the very recognizable square in front of the presidential building. And he said, "Prezydent tut," which means the president is here. And he pointed to his team and he gave one of those rousing speeches of ‘Ukraine is not going to give up.’ And it was electrifying to the nation. 

Sarah [00:34:32] To the world. I remember it. And I'm not Ukrainian. Vividly. I remember it vividly.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:34:37] Yeah, it was it was really incredible. And he has continued doing it. Almost every night, he does an address to the Ukrainian people in one form of social media or another. I mean, it is incredible. He is a really gifted communicator, and he pointed out to international audiences. So, he comes here and he cites Pearl Harbor and our history to us. He goes to Britain and he talks about Winston Churchill and paraphrasing him. It is incredible. I mean, he uses his background as an entertainer, as a communicator, to really great effect. And it has galvanized, as I said, the country. And as you said, the world.  

Sarah [00:35:18] You went to Ukraine recently and what did you see? Where do you feel like we are with his leadership, with the continuing support from Western nations? The reporting is pretty consistent. Putin feels like he's just going to wait it out and the West support will flag and then he can come in. What's your assessment of that strategy and where we're at?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:35:40] What my military colleagues tell me is long war or short war, there's no way that Russia can actually win. But the strong impression that I had when I was in Ukraine is that the Ukrainian people are courageous. They are committed. They are confident they are going to win, but they are also tired. It's been a year and they are wondering victory at what cost? Because you can measure cost in many different ways, but every Ukrainian is measuring that cost in lives lost. And how many more lives are going to need to be lost? And we in the West and the U.S. have the ability to lower that cost. And I think we should, because I think a short term war is in Ukraine's interests. And that saying that not just the Biden administration, but other governments have of "We'll be with you for as long as it takes" I think we need to change that motto to we will be with you and provide you as much as you need, as quickly as you need so you can win, Ukraine. Ukraine needs to win. Ukraine needs to win for itself, for all the obvious reasons, because this is an existential war for Ukraine, where Putin has declared that they don't exist as a people. And while in the beginning the Ukrainians were negotiating and putting a lot on the table, according to the media, the idea of neutrality, the idea of ceding some land, etc. And then the Ukrainians started liberating some of the towns around Kiev, including Bucha, the famous butcher. And they saw people who had been tortured, they saw civilians dead. They saw women who had been raped, missing children deported to Russia to hopefully be found at some point, but maybe not. And the Ukrainian people and Zelensky personally at that point understood that this was an existential war, that they had a choice to fight on or to be killed by the Russians, that the Russians were not going to allow them to live on as a Ukrainian people. And so, the only option the Ukrainians really have is to continue to fight, and they are absolutely determined to do so.  

[00:38:00] And that is as a society, because one of the really strong impressions that you have when you're in Ukraine is that this is a completely mobilized society, that people do what they see needs to get done, start a soup kitchen, drive an ambulance, fix vehicles and drive them to the front because they need more of that particular kind of vehicle. They do whatever they see needs to be done, not because President Zelensky said you need to do X or the mayor has said that, but because it's a mobilized society and they are all helping each other and helping the military first and foremost. So, clearly for Ukraine, it's important to win. But why is it important for the United States? I think as so often happens, Zelensky said it best when he addressed Congress back in December. He said, "What you are doing is not charity. It's an investment in your security and in global security." And I think that is exactly right, because Putin has told us in his writings and his actions that he is going to keep on going if he gets Ukraine. If he is rewarded with some form of victory, if he doesn't get all of Ukraine, he's going to regroup, rearm and come back for more when he thinks we're chasing the next shiny object. And if he gets all of Ukraine, he will go further west. He's told us that. And when you look at the history of what he did in Chechnya, what he did in Georgia, taking two chunks of Georgia-Ukraine in 2014, Syria, now Ukraine, again, I think we need to believe. I think we need to understand that he is not going to be satisfied. He will keep on going. And if Russia is not defeated in Ukraine, we in the West are going to need to deal with Russia again at some later point, which may not be a point that is of our choosing or to our advantage. And so, it's just best to deal with this issue now.  

Sarah [00:39:52] Well, and it's so frustrating because it's like the idea that, well, it's dragging on for too long. As if we don't have any control over that, as if we couldn't provide, like you said, what they need to win this. To fully invest. Because I think what the point you made is so important and deserves emphasis, which is sometimes the debate gets set up as if, well, when this war is over, then it's done and we don't have to worry about this anymore. No, no, no. We'll just have to worry about him somewhere else that could be worse or more expensive or more horrific, even though this has been pretty horrific. And I think that we're going to get stuck in this binary where it's like this continues or this ends. And that's the decision we're making when that is not the decision we're making.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:40:35] Yeah. And I think also right now there is a real focus on China, understandably. But how we support Ukraine, how we deal with shoring up a democracy, how we deal in countering Russia, the Chinese are watching, so are other authoritarian regimes, and they are taking lessons. And if we don't defend Ukraine properly, Chinese are going to take note. And there's a lot been written recently about how China is upping its production of nuclear weapons because they can see the effect of the threats of Putin and his entourage that they might use tactical nuclear weapons. And while you never want to discount that. You want to really look at anything having to do with nuclear weapons very, very carefully. I think most experts believe that it is unlikely that Putin is going to use tactical moves. It brings him no advantage. He would be isolated in the international community, even more so right now. I mean, the list goes on. And what do you do for an encore? The threat is powerful, more powerful in some ways than the actual use of a weapon that will contaminate the battlefield you expect your soldiers to go onto. But I think because we are concerned about the use of nuclear weapons, we are in some ways self-deterring from giving Ukraine all that it needs in order to win. And China is taking that. So, from my perspective, the road to managing China goes through Ukraine.  

Beth [00:42:20] Is there a path for Ukrainian victory here that allows Putin to remain in power? What is the way this ends for Russia?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:42:33] That is such a good question. Putin has unchecked power in Russia. I recently heard somebody comment that, oh, I never thought I would say I miss the days of the Politburo. But the Politburo was a council that ruled the Soviet Union. And the first secretary of the Communist Party, it was definitely the most powerful person. But he still had to answer to the Politburo. And Putin doesn't have to answer to anyone. So, on the one hand, that's never good. On the other hand, he could choose-- not that he's going to-- he could choose to withdraw from Ukraine. He could choose to present that as some sort of a victory. And the Russian people would probably buy it, or at least not protest or say anything else. He could choose to do that. And who knows? Maybe the Russian military would be relieved because they've had rather a tough go of it. But I think all of that is very, very unlikely. I think it's going to be important that Ukraine win and force Russia out. Because for there to be stability in the region, Russia has to give up its dreams of empire, that it can change borders or forcibly take whatever it wants because it can. I mean, Russia is an historically expansionist country. But other countries have given up their dreams of empire. Look at the UK. I mean, the list goes on. And Russia needs to join this century-- maybe the last century, actually-- and move forward, because that is certainly in the interests of European and global security. But it's also in Russia's interests so that Russia can overtime rejoin the community of nations.  

Sarah [00:44:30] Well, before we wrap up, we so appreciate your expertise on all these things. We do want to talk a little bit about your memoir, Lessons From the Edge. It's full of incredible stories. I want to take a hard turn because you obviously encountered an enormous amount of discrimination in the State Department during your career. You write about it, I think, so transparently and so beautifully and empowering. And I really wanted you to share the story of Alison Palmer's lawsuit and how that impacted your career and your decision not to talk about it for a long time and your decision to share it in the memoir, because I think it is just incredible.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:45:06] So, the State Department, when I joined in pre-history--  

Sarah [00:45:11] That's not true.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:45:12] I joined in 1986. And the State Department reflected society as a whole. I mean, there just weren't that many women even in business and certainly not at the State Department. And there were very few women in leadership positions. It was a man's world and men felt very comfortable. My boss telling my parents that women can't be real foreign Service officers, certainly not political officers, that sort of thing. And feeling very comfortable saying that. This is at the time that I was a political officer working for him, so that was very off putting. But there were pioneers who had joined the Foreign Service as officers decades before I had. They must have been made of steel. And one of those women was Alison Palmer, and she was constantly passed over for jobs and promotions because the man needed it, because the man had a family to support that sort of thing. She won her lawsuit and got whatever compensation. But then she instituted a class action lawsuit against the State Department, and the State Department fought it tooth and nail for decades. And within the State Department, which most of the bosses were male, they felt that this was a terrible thing, that this woman was trying to upend the system and to put unqualified women in places where the white men deserved to be. So, that's the environment that I came into the Foreign Service. And in 1992, an appellate court, after decades, ruled in an Allison Palmer's favor in a class action suit, and they ruled that the State Department was discriminating in how it wrote the exam for intake, how they brought people into the State Department, how they assigned specialties to women, how they assigned jobs to women, and how they promoted women. So, it was a clean sweep. The State Department was discriminating against women in all categories.  

[00:47:29] And so, a number of reforms were instituted that I think benefited not just women, but the institution as a whole. But 14 women were given spots to change their specialty if they wanted to. And I was notified that I qualified to compete for this. So, I competed for it and I got it. And that's how I got the job as political officer in Moscow. So, off I went.  And that's where I had the boss who said women can't be political officers. If I had any doubts that I should have kept this to myself, I was confirmed in that judgment. And kind of every job I thought I'm not going to share this information because people are going to look at me differently. They're going to look at me as I don't deserve to be in this job. And I continue that way of thinking. The gaslighting was so strong in my head through three ambassadorships where I didn't share this information with anybody in the State Department because I wanted them to think that I deserved to be in the job through my hard work and good work. And I had a track record of 30 years and yet I was still insecure about this. And when I wrote the book, I thought do I include this? Do I finally sort of reveal this? And I talked to a number of friends and also I talked to friends about some of the other stories of discrimination and so forth at the State Department. And I felt, well, I didn't want it to be the only thing I wrote about it. I thought it was important for people to understand what that world was like and that we have come a long way, but we still have a long way to go. I thought that was really important.  

Sarah [00:49:17] Well, I think it's as the center point of all of these other stories was so incredible. And I think the way you write very transparently about your bosses and this is how it was treated and this is how it impacted my work. I mean, you are absolutely a pioneer [inaudible] and you are absolutely made of steel. And I think we even touched on the impeachment and the area in which I think most people identify you as being made of steel. But I think it's just an incredible story. And I think you wrote about it just really, really beautifully in the context of your life. Y'all, there is bullet dodging and she gets to meet Princess Diana. I cannot even sum up the stories in this book. It's incredible. I highly recommend it. It's such a beautiful memoir. Great job.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:49:59] Thank you so much. I really appreciate it.  

Beth [00:50:10] We always end our show talking about something Outside of Politics because we try to remember that we're all more than one thing. And thinking about you're more than a diplomat and Ukraine is more than its history with Russia and its history with corruption and this war, so I wonder if you could tell us about some aspect of Ukrainian culture, cuisine or music or art, something that you really love about being in Ukraine?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:50:34] Well, so the cultural life is so, so vibrant. And as I now understand, often happens during times of war. The cultural scene in Ukraine has just taken off exponentially. Now, whether it's music, whether it's writing. And that, I think, is really reaffirming. I think we're back to politics again. It's just wonderful to see and it's really reaffirming. The other thing I love about the Ukrainian people is-- we’ve all seen the resilience-- but they have a great sense of humor. So, I'll give you just one example. And humor is one of the ways they're dealing with the war.   

Sarah [00:51:17] Well, and art. You're fighting for something, right?  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:51:19] Yeah. And you are just putting the lie to Putin saying that there is no culture. I’ll tell you the joke. To say one other thing. This year, the Ukrainian woman, Oleksandra Matviichuk, she shared the Nobel Peace Prize with another person. And when I talked to her before, she went to accept this award and she speaks fluent English, she said that she was going to accept this award in an international setting in Ukrainian, because Putin tells us we don't have a language, but I'm going to show him and I'm going to show the world that we do. So, the joke is that-- this is not a funny setting, but you'll recall that in October, Putin expanded the total war against the Ukrainian people to the missile and drone strikes against the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. And the lights went out for a long period of time. And so, so many Ukrainians said Putin single handedly is going to be responsible for the biggest baby boom ever. You just have to love it.  

Sarah [00:52:39] Oh, love it. I love it.  

Beth [00:52:41] Well, thank you so much for being so generous with your time and expertise and your stories. It's been a real pleasure to talk with you.  

Sarah [00:52:48] Yes. Thank you so much. What a treat.  

Marie Yovanovitch [00:52:52] Well, it has been my pleasure. Thanks a lot.  

Beth [00:52:55] Thank you so much to Ambassador Yovanovitch for her time and her generosity. Thank you to all of you for listening. I want to remind you that if you'd like a transcript of this conversation or of any of our episodes, you can find that on our website, Pantsuitpoliticsshow.com. Just click on the podcast link and it will take you to all of our show notes that include full transcripts of the episodes. We'll be back in your ears on Friday. Until then, have the best week available to you.  

[00:53:36] Pantsuit Politics is produced by Studio D Podcast Production. Alise Napp is our managing director.  

Sarah [00:53:41] Maggie Penton is our community engagement manager. Dante Lima is the composer and performer of our theme music.  

Beth [00:53:47] Our show is listener-supported. Special thanks to our executive producers.  

Executive Producers [00:54:07] Martha Bronitsky. Ali Edwards. Janice Elliott. Sarah Greenup. Julie Haller. Helen Handley. Tiffany Hasler. Emily Holladay. Katie Johnson. Katina Zuganelis Kasling. Barry Kaufman. Molly Kohrs. Katherine Vollmer. Laurie LaDow. Lily McClure. Linda Daniel. Emily Neesley. Tawni Peterson. Tracey Puthoff. Sarah Ralph. Jeremy Sequoia. Katie Stigers. Karin True. Onica Ulveling. Nick and Alysa Villeli. Amy Whited. Emily Helen Olson. Lee Chaix McDonough. Morgan McHugh.   

Beth Jeff Davis. Melinda Johnston. Michelle Wood. Joshua Allen. Nichole Berklas. Paula Bremer and Tim Miller.

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